Proof systems & circuits
ZK circuits
Proof-system integrations
Transcript construction
Manual review of zero-knowledge circuits, custom primitives, signature and threshold schemes, privacy-preserving protocols, and post-quantum designs. We separate what the paper claims from what the circuit, protocol, and implementation actually guarantee.
Technology coverage
We review cryptographic designs and their implementations, including the systems below. During scoping, we agree the claimed guarantees, assumptions, and components to examine.
This list is not exhaustive.
Describe the cryptographic construction and the security properties it must preserve.
What we review
We review the claim, the construction, and the code. A correct paper does not make a correct circuit, and a correct circuit does not make a safe implementation.
Constraints, completeness, soundness, trusted setup, witnesses, and the gap between the intended statement and what is actually proven.
New constructions, modified standards, parameter choices, and whether the claimed security reduction still holds.
Signature schemes, aggregation, threshold signing, multiparty computation, nonce handling, and key generation.
Confidential transactions, anonymous credentials, zkTLS, private computation, and what still leaks under a realistic adversary.
Scheme selection, parameter sets, hybrid migrations, and implementation of lattice, hash-based, and other quantum-resistant primitives.
Constant-time behavior, side channels, API misuse, randomness, domain separation, and unsafe composition of otherwise sound parts.
Timing
A new construction, circuit, or protocol is about to be treated as a building block.
Users, counterparties, or regulators will rely on a confidentiality or unlinkability claim.
The algorithm, parameters, or hybrid transition changes what every caller is trusting.
Standard parts are being combined in a new way, and the composition has not been reviewed.
Our approach
Agree the scope and claimed security properties. Build a threat model that separates proven guarantees, design assumptions, and dependencies on standards or other components.
Follow the protocol, circuit, or primitive through the system. Document the properties each flow relies on and how leakage or weakened assumptions could break them.
Challenge parameters, composition, and implementation against the claimed properties. Add regression tests to your repo and record results with supporting evidence.
We always verify fixes through retesting and document which claims hold, fail, or remain unsupported. Tie the principal’s signed opinion to the reviewed commit and evidence.
What you receive
Breaks in the primitive, the circuit, the protocol, or the implementation, with impact and remediation.
What is proven, what is assumed, and which guarantees the rest of the system is inheriting. The register includes scenarios blocked by existing controls.
How a weakened assumption, leaked witness, or implementation flaw becomes a practical break, and which properties along that path held.
Each security property, its test result, and supporting evidence.
Regression tests for the reviewed circuit, primitive, or module, ready to rerun after fixes and future changes.
The principal’s conclusions, tied to the reviewed commit, cryptographic claims, and evidence.
Your review team
A principal leads each engagement. Your proposal names the specialists assigned to the scope.
Founder & Partner
Led a security engineering practice for Rust and non-EVM systems across Substrate and NEAR. Earlier, built vulnerability-detection engines at Invicti used by Fortune 50 and public-sector organizations.
Specialist Advisor
Cryptography engineer with a Ph.D. in Information Security and 13 published research articles. Worked on post-quantum cryptography at Tectonic and on MPC and zkTLS at Nillion, where he contributed to Nada and wrote technical reports on threshold ECDSA.
FAQ
Yes. We always provide remediation guidance and verify fixes through retesting. The final report records the remediation status and any unresolved findings.
This review checks the cryptographic guarantees those systems rely on, including the construction, assumptions, and implementation. It can run alongside a contract or protocol review when the two depend on each other.
Provide the specification, claimed security properties, threat model, and relevant papers or security arguments. For a review that includes implementation, we need access to the code during scoping, alongside build instructions, test vectors, and known limitations.
Yes. We examine the construction, its security arguments, parameter choices, and implementation within the agreed scope. We identify assumptions or claims the available evidence does not establish.
Yes. Reviews can cover scheme selection, parameter sets, hybrid classical-plus-PQC deployments, and the implementation of lattice, hash-based, and other quantum-resistant primitives.
We can review the construction and its security arguments, the implementation, or both. The proposal defines the properties, assumptions, and depth of analysis covered.
Describe the construction, the guarantee you need to check, and your deadline. We will propose a cryptography review.
Discuss your scope